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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

State of Ohio ex rel.
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD,

)
)

)
Relater,

)

)
vs.

No.

35777

)

)
RALPH ALVIS, Warden of
the Ohio Penitentiary,

)
)

)
Respondent.

ANSWER BRIEF OF RELATOR

)

The brief of the Attorney General concedes that Revised
Code Section

2725.05

is no bar to issuance of the writ if some-

thing extraordinary occurred, prior to judgment, which deprived
the court of its normal jurisdiction to impose sentence.
It is our position that such extraordinary event did
occur - namely, the concealment and suppression by the state of
material evidence beneficial to relater which in all probability
would have changed the verdict had it been revealed - that this
was a denial of due process which voided the trial, made the whole
proceeding a sham and a pretense, and destroyed the court's jurisdiction to impose sentence.
The Prosecutor's entire case was tried and submitted on
the theory that during the night of July )rd and the early morning of July 4th,

1954, there never was anyone in the Sheppard home

except the relater, his wife Marilyn, and his young son; that there

•

was no evidence of forcible entry and no evidence that any third

2

..

0

person was present; that the relator's description of a bushy haired

l

intruder was a figment of his imagination and that there was no such
person; that there was no car parked along Lake Road near the Sheppard residence; that the young son did not commit the murder; that
relater was the only other person who could have done it and that
he therefore must have done it.
The evidence which we have alleged was suppressed would
establish that an outside door to the Sheppard home (not the door
referred to in the brief of the Prosecuting Attorney) had been forced,
that a car was parked on Lake Road near the Sheppard home at the time
of the murder, that later that morning a bushy haired man whose clothing was spattered with brownish spots was seen on Lake Road west of
the Sheppard home and that blood found on Marilyn Sheppard's wrist
watch was not the blood of the relater or of Marilyn, but was the
blood of a third person.

Had all these facts been laid before the

jury, who can say that in all probability the jury would not have
set the relater free?

Just the proof that the blood was the blood

of a third person should have been enough.
This evidence would have gone far beyond raising a reasonable doubt about relator's guilt.
entire case.

It would have upset the state's

It would have proved that a third person was in the

house and that his blood was on Marilyn's watch.
The brief filed by the Prosecuting Attorney denies that
there was any concealment or suppression.

Attached to this brief as

Appendix A is a photostat of the front and back sides of a card
which was the original record in the office of the Coroner of Cuyahoga County on which was reported the tests made of the blood on
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the deceased woman's watch.

Contrary to what is said at page 6 of

the brief filed by the Prosecuting Attorney, this record was not
made available to the defense, nor did the defense know of its existence, before the trial.

This card shows that Mary Cowan, the

coroner's technician, ran the tests twice and found slight agglutination of both A and B cells both times.

Neither relator's blood nor

the blood of his murdered wife contained any B cells, so that not
even a trace of B could have been obtained from their blood.

The

blood on Marilyn's watch has to be the blood from some third person.
Once that fact has been established the other evidence which was
suppressed is especially significant.
This record also shows on its face that it was turned over
to the Prosecutor's office on November 4, 1954, at 10:27 A.M.

Al-

most four weeks later, on November 30, 1954, the Prosecutor put
Mary Cowan on the stand.
evidence.

The Prosecutor did not offer this card in

Without producing the card Mary Cowan testified that tests

had been made of the blood on the murdered woman's watch and that the
results were

"inconclusive'{~I\· 40~~ ~~ ss-examina ti on

she reiterated

that the tests were inconclusive. (.'R., +1 S""~ ) .
There can be no doubt whatsoever that when she made that
statement, both the witness and the Prosecutor knew that the tests
showed the presence of B cells.
The state may call this "trivia" .

We do not.

We submit

that it is vital information that should have been revealed if the
accused were to have the kind of fair trial that comports with due
process as guaranteed by the constitution.

We agree that the Prose-

cuting Attorney does not have to make the case for the defense, but
we believe that the facts of this case bring it squarely within the
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principles announced in State v. Rhoads, 81 O.

s.

397 at 424, when

the court said that a Prosecuting Attorney
"should not endeavor to convict an innocent person, and he
should not suppress or conceal evidence that might tend to
acquit the prisoner."
Under the constitution relater was guaranteed a fair trial
and due process of law.

The authorities are plain that if those

were denied to him the conviction was void and the writ of habeas
corpus must be granted.

The suppression by the prosecution of mater-

ial evidence favorable to the defendant is a denial of due process
for which habeas corpus will be granted.
Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63
87 L. Ed. 214;

s.

Ct. 177, 178

United States ex rel Montgomery v. Ragen, 86 F. Supp. 382;
United States ex rel Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F. (2d) 815,
certiorari denied 345 U.S. 904, rehearing denied
345 U.S. 946, where the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
said at page 820:
"We think that the conduct of the Commonwealth as outlined in the instant case is in conflict with our fundamental principles of liberty and justice. The suppression of
evidence favorable to Almeida was a denial of due process.
In Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216, 63 S. Ct. 177, 178,
87 L. Ed. 214, the Supreme Court of the United States said
that allegations of 'perjured testimony, knowingly used by
the State authorities to obtain [aJ conviction, and.,,.. *{:the deliberate suppression by those same authorities of evidence favorable to [a defendanfJ
~'" ~-' sufficiently charge
a deprivation of rights guaranteed bY. the Federal Constitution, and, if proven, would entitle fpimJ to release from
his present custody. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U .S. 103, 55
s. ct. 340, 79 L. Ed. 791. 1 The decision cited is the controlling authority.
It has been such for seventeen years."

*

On the same theory, the dueprocess clause is violated where
the state denies the accused the aid of counsel, Powell v. Alabama,
287

u.s.

torture,

45, or where a conviction has been obtained by violence and
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278.

As the court said in

5.
the latter case at page 286:
"The due process clause requires 'that state action,
whether through one agency or another, shall be consistent
with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice
which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions.' Hebert vs. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316. 11
The same theory underlies the numerous cases in which
the use by the prosecution of testimony known to be perjured has
been recognized as a denial of due process and ground for granting
habeas corpus.
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103;
White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760;
Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 316 U.S. 642.
At page

5

of his brief, the Attorney General cites the

case of Jones v. Commonwealth, 269 Ky. 779, on what constitutes
"due process of law".

This is a famous case, which is also reported

in 267 Ky. 465, 102 S.W. (2d) 345, and in 269 Ky. 772, 108 S.W. (2d)
812.

In that case the perjury was not known to the prosecution at

the time of trial, but was discovered after the time for filing a
motion for new trial had run.

The highest court of Kentucky denied

relief, but the convicted man went into the federal courts which
took a broader view of what due process requires and granted the
writ of habeas corpus.

In Jones v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 97

F. (2d) 335, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals had this to say
at page 338:
"The concept of due process as it has become crystallized in the public mind and by judicial pronouncement,
is formulated in Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, 55
S. Ct. 340, 341, 342, 79 L. Ed. 791, 98 A.L.R. 406.
Its
requirement in safe-guarding the liberty of the citizen
against deprivation through the action of the state embodies

6.
those 'fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at
the base of our civil and political institutions,' referred
to in Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316, 317, 47 s.
Ct. 103, 71 L. Ed. 270, 48 A.L.R. 1102. This requirement
cannot be satisfied 'By mere notice and hearing if a state
has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and
jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured.
Such a contrivance by a state to procure the conviction
and imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation.'
If it be urged that the concept
thus formulated but condemns convictions obtained by the
state through testimony known by the prosecuting officers
to have been perjured, then the answer must be that the
delineated requirement of due process in the Mooney Case
embraces no more than the facts of that case require, and
that 1 the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie at
the base of our civil and political institutions' must
with equal abhorrence condemn as a travesty a conviction
upon perjured testimony if later, but fortunately not too
late, its falseness is discovered, and that the state in
the one case as in the other is required to afford a corrective judicial process to remedy the alleged wrong, if
constitutional rights are not to be impaired."
The net result of the above authorities is that where a
false picture has been presented to the court and jury, whether
it be by the use of perjured testimony or the suppression of material evidence favorable to the defendant, or by false evidence
obtained by violence and intimidation of witnesses, or by failure
to supply the defendant with adequate counsel, the requirements of
due process have not been met, the trial is void ab initio, and
habeas corpus must be granted.
"Due course of law" in Article I Section 16 of the Ohio
Constitution is the same as "due process of law" in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution.
186 at 201 •
•

State v. French, 71

o.s.

7.

Certainly the suppression by the state of the evidence
set forth in relator's petition for habeas corpus was not consistent

4

with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice set forth
above, and if that suppression is proven, it can not be said that
relater had a fair trial or was given due process of law.
The full effect of this suppression of evidence on relator1 s right to a fair trial can not be determined until the court
hears the evidence.

Neither the Prosecuting Attorney nor the Attor-

ney General has heard any of this new evidence.

Their briefs are

drawn as if such evidence had already been introduced.

They draw

conclusions, which, of course, are erroneous, from facts that have
not yet been established.

The assertion of evidence that will be

introduced under the petition as amended is not evidence that is
in the record.

This evidence, which is entirely new as far as the

record is concerned, has been obtained after long and difficult investigation and its value cannot be determined by this Court on
opinions expressed by opposing counsel before it is heard.
Relater is entitled to a hearing in order to establish
the facts set forth in his petition.

On this point we call atten-

tion to the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ex rel Herman v.
Clouty,

350

U.S. 116, 100 L. Ed. 126.

Eight years after conviction

upon his plea of guilty and after sentence, the petitioner filed a
petition for habeas corpus in the same court where he had been convicted, asking that his conviction be held invalid as in violation
of the due process clause.
•

He alleged that his plea of guilty was

the result of coercion and that he had not been given the benefit

8.

of counsel.

The state filed an answer denying the allegations and

the Pennsylvania court dismissed the petition summarily without any

•

hearing.

The Supreme Court of the United States reversed and re-

manded the case, holding that the petitioner could not be denied a
hearing just because the Prosecuting Attorney denied the charges.
The court said at

350

U.S. page 123:

"The chief argument made by the State here in support
of the court's summary dismissal of the petition is this:
'Counsel for petitioner argues that since facts are alleged in the petition, a hearing must be held. Since our
answer contradicted the allegations in the petition, the
lower court was not required to grant a hearing. This
contention was sustained by the Superior Court. 1 We cannot accept this argument. Under the allegations here petitioner is entitled to relief if he can prove his charges.
He cannot be denied a hearing merely because the allegations of his petition were contradicted by the prosecuting
officers."
All that relator asks is a chance to prove that the evidence was suppressed.

Why are such strenuous efforts being made

to prevent him from making this proof?
truth come out, and why?

Who is afraid to have the

Is it because of any real belief that

further litigation will be "oppressive" as charged by the Prosecuting Attorney?

Or is it because certain persons are afraid to let

the truth be known, and would rather let an innocent man rot in the
penitentiary than admit that they made a mistake?
Relator was not only tried "in the atmosphere of a Roman
holiday" as this Court so aptly described his trial, but he was
convicted through the suppression of material evidence.

..

His con-

viction is a gross miscarriage of justice, a blot on the adminis-

•

9.

tration of justice in this state.

The writ of habeas corpus is

the only available remedy to right this wrong.

•

Under the above

authorities it should be granted .
Respectfully submitted,

Fred

w.

Garmone

Attorneys for Relator .
•

•
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that three copies of the foregoing
Answer Brief of Relator have been mailed this

..

/ J~ day of .March,

1959, to .Mark .McElroy, Attorney General, State House Annex, Columbus, Ohio, and to John T. Corrigan, Prosecuting Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Criminal Courts Building, 1560 East 21st Street,
Cleveland, Ohio .
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